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The EU Global Strategy and Defence: The 
Challenge of Thinking Strategically about Means 
Sven Biscop & Jo Coelmont 
Since strategy is about connecting ends, 
ways and means, the means constrain the 
ends. It would be unrealistic to set 
objectives for which the means are 
unavailable or cannot be acquired in time. 
But it would be equally unrealistic to 
underestimate the available means. To 
wilfully ignore one’s potential is to 
handicap one’s strategy from the outset. 
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EU payroll and put under EU command), two 
Battlegroups could implement but the slightest 
part of the extensive tasks that the EUGS sets 
to the military.  
 
In what seems at first sight to be a positive 
development though, the brigade has made its 
entry into the EU debate. Proposals are on the 
table to increase the EU’s military level of 
ambition from the ability to deploy two 
Battlegroups to one brigade. Four battalions 
instead of two, in other words: a doubling, yes, 
but still woefully inadequate to implement the 
EUGS.  
 
In actual fact, a brigade does not constitute an 
increased level of ambition at all. For the point 
of comparison, the current level of ambition, 
is not the two Battlegroups. It is the Headline 
Goal that the EU set in 1999: the ability to 
deploy, and to sustain for at least one year, up 
to an army corps (i.e. 60,000 troops) and 
concomitant air and naval forces. The corps 
level is the indeed the only appropriate scale 
when discussing the implementation of the 
ambitious EUGS.  
 
Many are in the habit of ridiculing what they 
consider an unachievable level of ambition. 
But they ignore the fact that for more than a 
decade now, EU Member States have 
continuously fielded troop numbers, for 
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Yet this is exactly what is threatening to 
happen in the debate about the defence 
implications of the EU Global Strategy for 
Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS). The 
High Representative, Federica Mogherini, aims 
to detail these in an Implementation Plan to be 
submitted to Member States by the end of 
November 2016.  
 
DON’T MENTION THE BATTLEGROUPS  
Once again, the Battlegroups, the EU scheme 
to have two battalion-size forces on stand-by, 
are absorbing a lot of attention. That is 
comfortable for everybody, for as the 
Battlegroups have been discussed time and 
again, the arguments are well rehearsed and no 
profound reflection is required. This debate by 
now can be run on autopilot. The problem is 
that even if the absence of any automatic 
availability of the Battlegroups could be solved 
(and it cannot, unless troops were hired on the  
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CSDP, NATO, UN and coalition operations, 
which when taken together easily add up to 
the Headline Goal and more. Furthermore, 
even a quick look at all ongoing operations in 
which forces from EU Member States are 
engaged and at the theatres in which the need 
for additional deployments is very likely, 
immediately reveals that the equivalent of – at 
least – a corps is definitely required if we want 
to deal with all of today’s challenges.  
 
DON’T PREPARE FOR THE PAST WAR  
To this day, however, EU Member States 
cannot deploy such numbers alone for any 
longer period of time. They can only do so if 
the US provides the bulk of the strategic 
enablers. And in practice they count on the 
availability of US forces and US political will 
to act as a strategic reserve as well. For 
contrary to good military practice, EU 
Member States have insufficient capabilities to 
simultaneously deploy troops up to the 
equivalent of a corps and have as many again 
in reserve in case an operation goes awry. In 
the military field therefore, EU Member States 
do not possess strategic autonomy.  
 
Yet that is the objective that the EUGS has 
set: not only does the Strategy increase the 
tasks for the military, it also commits Member 
States to undertake these tasks alone if and 
when necessary. The need for strategic 
autonomy is obvious: regardless of who wins 
the presidential elections in the US, if one 
candidate considers statements about 
dissolving NATO to be a vote-winner, it 
means that for more than just a marginal 
segment of US opinion commitment to 
European security is less evident than it once 
was. If Europeans do not demonstrate the will 
and ability to do more, they are at great risk of 
losing their allies across the Atlantic.  
 
But, the argument will be raised, once Brexit 
happens and the British contribution is 
deducted from the EU force catalogue, the 
 corps level will definitely be out of sight, let 
alone strategic autonomy. For sure, British 
capabilities cannot be easily compensated for 
by the remaining Member States’ existing 
capabilities. For one, however, British forces 
will not disappear, and Britain will still be in 
Europe, so when a crisis threatens the security 
of Europe, it threatens the security of the UK 
as well. If military action is called for, Britain is 
more likely to participate than not, even 
though after Brexit it will most probably no 
longer be formally engaged in the Headline 
Goal process.  
 
Furthermore, together the EU27 still spend 
more than €175 billion per year on defence, for 
a total of more than 1.35 million troops. Even 
without the UK therefore, achieving the 
current corps-level Headline Goal – which, lest 
we forget, in 1999 was set for a Union of just 
fifteen – should be eminently feasible. As 
should be the new objective of achieving 
strategic autonomy at this level, over time.  
 
Over time, for it would be a major mistake 
indeed to limit the EU level of ambition to 
existing capabilities today. An ambition is a 
project to be realised in the future. It is to 
guide the acquisition of new capabilities, in the 
long term. Now is the time to decide which 
capabilities Europe needs in twenty years’ time 
and beyond. That similarly implies looking at 
the potential threats and challenges in 2035 
and beyond as well, and not just at today’s 
security environment.  
 
CONCLUSION: AIM HIGH  
The Implementation Plan stands or falls with 
defining the level of ambition: which military 
means are the EU Member States willing to 
devote to the implementation of the EUGS? 
Regardless of whether in an actual future 
contingency EU Member States choose to 
deploy through CSDP, NATO the UN or an 
ad hoc coalition, autonomously or with the US: 
if capability development is not set on track 
now, there will be no European contribution in 
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any scenario. The first step is to think through 
the implications of the three military tasks in 
the EUGS – protecting Europe, building 
capacity in our partners, and responding to 
crisis – and to indicate the type and the scale of 
forces that they might require, now and in the 
future.  
 
Protecting Europe, for example, can imply 
operations on Europe’s borders, but as well a 
naval task force or even a carrier group to 
safeguard the sea lines of communication. 
Capacity-building can entail long-term efforts 
in several neighbouring countries, but also 
military cooperation activities with partners 
such as ASEAN, especially in the maritime 
area. Responding to (or preventing) crisis may 
require more than one long-term stabilization 
operation, of at least brigade-size, in the 
neighbourhood, without forgetting that the 
EUGS also mentions contributing to 
worldwide UN peacekeeping. But it can also 
mean a high-intensity crisis management 
operation of several brigades and/or 
squadrons in the neighbourhood. These 
scenarios may occur simultaneously, so a high 
degree of concurrency is inevitable.  
 
On this basis, the Implementation Plan cannot 
but conclude that the current Headline Goal, 
i.e. the corps level and equivalent air and naval 
forces, is the point of departure. Besides, how 
would Member States explain to their publics 
that 17 years after setting the corps-level 
Headline Goal, and in response to an 
ambitious EUGS, their proposal would be to 
lower the military level of ambition? Not the 
Battlegroups therefore, not a brigade, not even 
a division – but the corps.  
 
This in turn allows to quantify the requirement 
for strategic enablers, which the EUGS itself 
strongly emphasizes, in line with the objective 
of strategic autonomy. That objective also 
implies that EU Member States gradually 
provide their own strategic reserves. In 
combination with a gradual increase in the 
degree of concurrency that EU Member States 
have to be able to deal with, this can allow the 
Implementation Plan to give an indication of 
how the Headline Goal can develop over time.  
 
Then comes the implementation of the 
Implementation Plan: Commission-funded 
defence research into future platforms, actual 
EDA-run projects to develop enablers, and 
ever closer cooperation between Member 
States’ forces, which in time could be solidified 
by activating a proper mechanism of 
Permanent Structured Cooperation.  
 
First things first though: an unequivocal 
translation of the political level of ambition 
expressed in the EUGS into a realistic but real 
military level of ambition.  
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